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Abstract
We study pricing and superhedging strategies for game options in an imperfect
market with default. We extend the results obtained by Kifer in [23] in the case of
a perfect market model to the case of an imperfect market with default, when the
imperfections are taken into account via the nonlinearity of the wealth dynamics. We
introduce the seller’s price of the game option as the infimum of the initial wealths
which allow the seller to be superhedged. We prove that this price coincides with the
value function of an associated generalized Dynkin game, recently introduced in [14],
expressed with a nonlinear expectation induced by a nonlinear BSDE with default
jump. We moreover study the existence of superhedging strategies. We then address
the case of ambiguity on the model, - for example ambiguity on the default probability
- and characterize the robust seller’s price of a game option as the value function of a
mixed generalized Dynkin game. We study the existence of a cancellation time and a
trading strategy which allow the seller to be super-hedged, whatever the model is.
Key-words: Game options, imperfect markets, generalized Dynkin games, nonlinear
expectations, backward stochastic differential equations, nonlinear pricing, super-hedging
price, doubly reflected backward stochastic differential equations.
1 Introduction
Game options, which have been introduced by Kifer (2000) [23], are derivative contracts
that can be terminated by both counterparties at any time before a maturity date T . More
precisely, a game option allows the seller to cancel it and the buyer to exercise it at any
stopping time smaller than T . If the buyer exercises at time τ before the seller cancels, then
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the seller pays the buyer the amount ξτ , but if the seller cancels before the buyer exercises,
then he pays the amount ζσ ≥ ξτ to the buyer at the cancellation time σ. The difference
ζσ−ξσ is interpreted as a penalty that the seller pays to the buyer for the cancellation of the
contract. In short, if the buyer selects an exercise time τ and the seller selects a cancellation
time σ, then the latter pays to the former the payoff ξτ1τ≤σ + ζσ1τ>σ at time τ ∧ σ.
In the case of classical perfect markets, Kifer introduces the ”fair price” of the game
option, defined as the minimum initial wealth needed for the seller to cover his liability to
pay the payoff to the buyer until a cancellation time, whatever is the exercise time chosen
by the buyer. He shows both in the CCR discrete-time model and in the Black and Scholes
model that this price is equal to the value function of the following Dynkin game:
sup
τ
inf
σ
EQ[ξ˜τ1τ≤σ + ζ˜σ1τ>σ] = inf
σ
sup
τ
EQ[ξ˜τ1τ≤σ + ζ˜σ1τ>σ], (1.1)
where ξ˜t and ζ˜t are the discounted values of ξt and ζt, equal to e
−rtξt and e
−rtζt respec-
tively in the Black and Scholes model, where r is the instantaneous interest rate. Here, EQ
denotes the expectation under the unique martingale probability measure Q of the market
model. Further research on the pricing of game options and on more sophisticated game-
type financial contracts includes in particular papers by Dolinsky and Kifer (2007) [12] and
Dolinsky and al. (2011) [11] in the discrete time case, and by Hamade`ne (2006) [18] in a
continuous time perfect market model with continuous payoffs ξ and ζ . We also mention the
paper by Bielecki and al. (2009) [3] which studies the pricing of game options in a market
model with default. Note that in [22], Kallsen and Kuhn (2004) study game options in an
incomplete market. They consider another type of pricing called neutral valuation via utility
maximization.
The aim of the present paper is to study pricing and hedging issues for game options in
the case of imperfections in the market model taken into account via the nonlinearity of the
wealth dynamics, modeled via a nonlinear driver g. We moreover include the possibility of
a default. A large class of imperfect market models can fit in our framework, like different
borrowing and lending interest rates, or taxes on the profits from risky investments. Our
model also includes the case when the seller of the option is a ”large trader” whose hedging
strategy may affect the market prices and the default probability.
Here, we suppose that the payoffs ξ and ζ associated with the game option are right-
continuous left-limited (RCLL) only and they satisfy Mokobodzki’s condition. We call
seller’s price of the game option, the infimum (denoted by u0) of the initial wealths such
that there exists a cancellation time σ and a portfolio strategy which allow the seller to pay
ξτ (at time τ) to the buyer if the buyer exercises at any time τ ≤ σ, and ζσ (at time σ) if the
buyer has still not exercise at time σ. Note that this infimum is not necessarily attained. We
provide a characterization of the seller’s price u0 of the game option as the (common) value
of a corresponding generalized Dynkin game (recently introduced in [14]). More precisely,
we show that
u0 = sup
τ
inf
σ
Eg[ξτ1τ≤σ + ζσ1τ>σ] = inf
σ
sup
τ
Eg[ξτ1τ≤σ + ζσ1τ>σ], (1.2)
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where Eg is a nonlinear expectation/evaluation induced by a nonlinear BSDE with default
jump solved under the primitive probability measure P with driver g. Note that in the
particular case of a perfect market, the driver g is linear and one can show by using an
actualization procedure and a change of probability measure that (1.2) corresponds to (1.1).
We prove that, under an additional left-regularity assumption on ζ (but not on ξ), there
exist a cancellation time and a trading strategy which allow the seller to be super-hedged.
In this case, the infimum in the definition of the seller’s price u0 is attained. When ζ is only
RCLL, the infimum is not necessarily attained. However, we show that for each ε > 0, the
amount u0 allows the seller to be super-hedged up to ε until a well chosen cancellation time.
The proofs of these results rely on the links between generalized Dynkin games and nonlinear
doubly reflected BSDEs with default jump.
The second main question we study is the pricing and superhedging problem of game
options in the case of uncertainty on the (imperfect) market model. To the best of our
knowledge, this problem has not been studied in the literature except by Dolinsky (2014)
in [10] in a discrete time framework. In particular, our model can take into account an
ambiguity on the default probability as illustrated in Section 4.3. We prove that the robust
seller’s price of the game option under uncertainty, defined as the infimum of the initial
wealths with allow the seller to be superhedged whatever the model is, coincides with the
value function of a mixed generalized Dynkin game. We also study the existence of robust
superhedging strategies.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we introduce our imperfect market model
with default and nonlinear wealth dynamics. In Section 3, we study pricing and superhedging
of game options and their links with generalized Dynkin games. In Section 4, we address the
case of an imperfect market with model ambiguity. Section 5 provides some complementary
results concerning the buyer’s point of view and the case with dividends. Some results on
doubly reflected BSDEs with default jumps and a useful lemma of analysis are given in
Appendix.
2 Imperfect market model with default
2.1 Market model with default
Let (Ω,G, P ) be a complete probability space equipped with two stochastic processes: a
unidimensional standard Brownian motion W and a jump process N defined by Nt = 1ϑ≤t
for any t ∈ [0, T ], where ϑ is a random variable which models a default time. We assume
that this default can appear at any time that is P (ϑ ≥ t) > 0 for any t ≥ 0. We denote by
G = {Gt, t ≥ 0} the augmented filtration that is generated by W and N (in the sense of [9,
IV-48]). We suppose that W is a G-Brownian motion. We denote by P the G-predictable
σ-algebra. Let (Λt) be the predictable compensator of the nondecreasing process (Nt). Note
that (Λt∧ϑ) is then the predictable compensator of (Nt∧ϑ) = (Nt). By uniqueness of the
predictable compensator, Λt∧ϑ = Λt, t ≥ 0 a.s. We assume that Λ is absolutely continuous
w.r.t. Lebesgue’s measure, so that there exists a nonnegative process λ, called the intensity
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process, such that Λt =
∫ t
0
λsds, t ≥ 0. Since Λt∧ϑ = Λt, λ vanishes after ϑ. We denote by
M the compensated martingale which satisfies
Mt = Nt −
∫ t
0
λsds .
Let T > 0 be the finite horizon. We introduce the following sets:
• S2 is the set of G-adapted RCLL processes ϕ such that E[sup0≤t≤T |ϕt|2] < +∞.
• A2 is the set of real-valued non decreasing RCLL predictable processes A with A0 = 0
and E(A2T ) <∞.
• H2 is the set of G-predictable processes Z such that ‖Z‖2 := E
[ ∫ T
0
|Zt|2dt
]
<∞ .
• H2λ := L2(Ω×[0, T ],P, λtdt), equipped with the scalar product 〈U, V 〉λ := E
[ ∫ T
0
UtVtλtdt
]
,
for all U, V in H2λ. For each U ∈ H2λ, we set ‖U‖2λ := E
[ ∫ T
0
|Ut|2λtdt
]
<∞ .
Note that for each U ∈ H2λ, we have ‖U‖2λ = E
[ ∫ T∧ϑ
0
|Ut|2λtdt
]
because the G-intensity
λ vanishes after ϑ. Moreover, we can suppose that for each U in H2λ = L
2(Ω× [0, T ],P, λtdt),
U (or its representant in L2(Ω× [0, T ],P, λtdt) still denoted by U) vanishes after ϑ.
Moreover, T denotes the set of stopping times τ such that τ ∈ [0, T ] a.s. and for each S in
T , TS is the set of stopping times τ such that S ≤ τ ≤ T a.s.
We recall the martingale representation theorem (see e.g. [19]):
Lemma 2.1. Any G-local martingale m = (mt)0≤t≤T has the representation
mt = m0 +
∫ t
0
zsdWs +
∫ t
0
lsdMs , ∀ t ∈ [0, T ] a.s. , (2.1)
where z = (zt)0≤t≤T and l = (lt)0≤t≤T are predictable such that the two above stochastic
integrals are well defined. If m is a square integrable martingale, then z ∈ H2 and l ∈ H2λ.
We consider now a financial market with three assets with price process S = (S0, S1, S2)′
governed by the equation: 

dS0t = S
0
t rtdt
dS1t = S
1
t [µ
1
tdt+ σ
1
t dWt]
dS2t = S
2
t−
[µ2tdt+ σ
2
t dWt − dMt].
The process S0 = (S0t )0≤t≤T corresponds to the price of a non risky asset with interest rate
process r = (rt)0≤t≤T , S
1 = (S1t )0≤t≤T to a non defaultable risky asset, and S
2 = (S2t )0≤t≤T
to a defaultable asset with total default. The price process S2 vanishes after ϑ.
All the processes σ1, σ2, r, µ1, µ2 are predictable (that is P-measurable). We set σ =
(σ1, σ2)′. We make the following assumptions:
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Assumption 2.2. The coefficients σ1, σ2 > 0, and r, σ1, σ2, µ1, µ2, λ, λ−1,(σ1)
−1
, (σ2)
−1
are bounded.
We consider an investor, endowed with an initial wealth equal to x, who can invest his
wealth in the three assets of the market. At each time t < ϑ, he chooses the amount ϕ1t
(resp. ϕ2t ) of wealth invested in the first (resp. second) risky asset. However, after time ϑ,
the investor cannot invest his wealth in the defaultable asset since its price is equal to 0,
and he only chooses the amount ϕ1t of wealth invested in the first risky asset. Note that the
process ϕ2 can be defined on the whole interval [0, T ] by setting ϕ2t = 0 for each t ≥ ϑ. A
process ϕ. = (ϕ
1
t , ϕ
2
t )
′
0≤t≤T is called a risky assets stategy if it belongs to H
2 ×H2λ.
We denote by V x,ϕt (or simply Vt) the wealth, or equivalently the value of the portfolio, at
time t. The amount invested in the non risky asset at time t is then given by Vt− (ϕ1t +ϕ2t ).
The perfect market model. In the classical case of a perfect market model, the wealth
process and the strategy satisfy the self financing condition:
dVt = (rtVt + ϕ
1
t (µ
1
t − rt) + ϕ2t (µ2t − rt))dt+ (ϕ1tσ1t + ϕ2tσ2t )dWt − ϕ2tdMt. (2.2)
Setting Kt := −ϕ2t , and Zt := ϕ1tσ1t + ϕ2tσ2t , which implies that ϕ1t = (Zt + σ2tKt)(σ1t )−1, we
get
dVt = rtVt + (Zt + σ
2
tKt)(µ
1
t − rt)(σ1t )−1 −Kt(µ2t − rt)dt+ ZtdWt +KtdMt
= (rtVt + Ztθ
1
t +Ktθ
2
t λt)dt+ ZtdWt +KtdMt,
where θ1t :=
µ1t − rt
σ1t
and θ2t :=
σ2t θ
1
t − µ2t + rt
λt
1{t≤ϑ}.
Consider a European contingent claim with maturity T > 0 and payoff ξ which is GT mea-
surable, belonging to L2. The problem is to price and hedge this claim by construct-
ing a replicating portfolio. From [15, Proposition 2.6 ], there exists an unique process
(X,Z,K) ∈ S2 ×H2 ×H2λ solution of the following BSDE with default jump:
− dXt = −(rtXt + Ztθ1t +Ktθ2tλt)dt− ZtdWt −KtdMt ; XT = ξ. (2.3)
The solution (X,Z,K) provides the replicating portfolio. More precisely, the process X
corresponds to its value, and the hedging risky assets stategy ϕ ∈ H2λ is given by ϕ = Φ(Z,K),
where Φ is the one to one map defined on H2 ×H2λ by:
Definition 2.3. Let Φ be the functional defined by
Φ : H2 ×H2λ → H2 ×H2λ; (Z,K) 7→ Φ(Z,K) := ϕ,
where ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2) is given by
ϕ2t = −Kt ; ϕ1t =
Zt + σ
2
tKt
σ1t
,
which is equivalent to Kt = −ϕ2t ; Zt = ϕ1tσ1t + ϕ2t σ2t = ϕt′σt.
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Note that the processes ϕ2 and K, which belong to H2λ, both vanish after time ϑ.
The process X coincides with V X0,ϕ, the value of the portfolio associated with initial
wealth x = X0 and portfolio strategy ϕ. From the seller’s point of view, this portfolio is a
hedging portfolio. Indeed, by investing the initial amount X0 in the reference assets along
the strategy ϕ, the seller can pay the amount ξ to the buyer at time T (and similarly at each
initial time t). We derive that Xt is the price at time t of the option, called hedging price,
and denoted by Xt(ξ). By the representation property of the solution of a λ-linear BSDE
with default jump (see [15, Theorem 2.13]), we have that the solution X of BSDE (2.3) can
be written as follows:
Xt(ξ) = E[e
−
∫ T
t
rsdsζt,T ξ | Gt], (2.4)
where ζt,· satisfies
dζt,s = ζt,s−[−θ1sdWs − θ2sdMs]; ζt,t = 1. (2.5)
This defines a linear price system X : ξ 7→ X(ξ). Suppose now that
θ2t < 1, 0 ≤ t ≤ ϑ dt⊗ dP − a.s. (2.6)
Then ζt,· > 0. Let Q be the probability measure which admits ζ0,T as density on GT . Using
Girsanov’s theorem, it can be shown that Q is the unique martingale probability measure.In
this case, the price system X is increasing and corresponds to the classical arbitrage free
price system (see [19, 4, 3]).
Remark 2.4. We have presented above the case of a defaultable asset with total default.
A different model for the asset price S2 (see e.g. [19, Chapter 7, Section 9.3]) could be
considered:
dS2t = S
2
t−[µ
2
tdt+ σ
2
t dWt + βtdMt],
where βt 6= 0 and βt > −1, with βt, β−1t bounded. In this case, the price does not vanish
after the default time ϑ. We suppose that
µ1t − rt
σ1t
1{t>ϑ} =
µ2t − rt
σ2t
1{t>ϑ} dt⊗ dP − a.s. (2.7)
Let ζ0,· be defined by (2.5) with θ
1
t =
µ1t − rt
σ1t
; θ2t =
µ2t − σ2t θ1t − rt
βtλt
1{t≤ϑ}. Assume that
θ2t < 1, 0 ≤ t ≤ ϑ dt⊗ dP -a.s. The assumption (2.7) ensures that the probability measure
Q with ζ0,T as density on GT is the unique martingale probability measure. The arbitrage
free price of the contingent claim ξ is given by (2.4) and satisfies BSDE (2.3); moreover, the
hedging strategy ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2) is given by: ϕ2t =
Kt
βt
and ϕ1t =
Zt−ϕ2tσ
2
t
σ1t
.
The imperfect market model Mg. From now on, we assume that there are imperfec-
tions in the market which are taken into account via the nonlinearity of the dynamics of the
wealth. More precisely, the dynamics of the wealth V associated with strategy ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2)
can be written via a nonlinear driver, defined as follows:
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Definition 2.5 (Driver, λ-admissible driver). A function g is said to be a driver if
g : [0, T ]×Ω×R3 → R; (ω, t, y, z, k) 7→ g(ω, t, y, z, k) which is P ⊗B(R3)− measurable, and
such that g(., 0, 0, 0) ∈ H2.
A driver g is called a λ-admissible driver if moreover there exists a constant C ≥ 0 such
that dP ⊗ dt-a.s. , for each (y1, z1, k1), (y2, z2, k2),
|g(ω, t, y1, z1, k1)− g(ω, t, y2, z2, k2)| ≤ C(|y1 − y2|+ |z1 − z2|+
√
λt|k1 − k2|). (2.8)
The positive real C is called the λ-constant associated with driver g.
Note that condition (2.8) implies that for each t > ϑ, since λt = 0, g does not depend
on k. In other terms, for each (y, z, k), we have: g(t, y, z, k) = g(t, y, z, 0), t > ϑ dP ⊗ dt-a.s.
Let x ∈ R be the initial wealth and let ϕ = (ϕ1, ϕ2) in H2 ×H2λ be a portfolio strategy.
We suppose that the associated wealth process V x,ϕt (or simply Vt) satisfies the following
dynamics:
− dVt = g(t, Vt, ϕt′σt,−ϕ2t )dt− ϕt′σtdWt + ϕ2tdMt, (2.9)
with V0 = x. Since g is lipschitz with respect to y, this formulation makes sense. Indeed,
setting f 1t :=
∫ t
0
ϕt
′σtdWs + ϕ
2
tdMs, for each ω, the deterministic function (V
Y0,ϕ
t (ω)) is
defined as the unique solution of the following deterministic differential equation:
V
x,ϕ
t (ω) = x−
∫ t
0
g(ω, s, V x,ϕs (ω), ϕs
′σs(ω),−ϕ2s(ω))ds+ f 1t (ω), 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (2.10)
Note that, equivalently, setting Zt = ϕt
′σt and Kt = −ϕ2t , the dynamics (2.9) of the
wealth process Vt can be written as follows:
− dVt = g(t, Vt, Zt, Kt)dt− ZtdWt −KtdMt. (2.11)
In the following, our imperfect market model is denoted by Mg.
Note that in the case of a perfect market (see (2.3)), we have:
g(t, y, z, k) = −rty − θ1t z − θ2t kλt, (2.12)
which is a λ-admissible driver by Assumption 2.2.
2.2 A nonlinear pricing system
Pricing and hedging European options in the imperfect market Mg leads to BSDEs with
nonlinear driver g and a default jump. By [15, Proposition 2.6], we have
Proposition 2.6. Let g be a λ-admissible driver, let ξ ∈ L2(GT ). There exists an unique
solution (X(T, ξ), Z(T, ξ), K(T, ξ)) (denoted simply by (X,Z,K)) in S2 × H2 × H2λ of the
following BSDE:
− dXt = g(t, Xt, Zt, Kt)dt− ZtdWt −KtdMt; XT = ξ. (2.13)
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Let us consider a European option with maturity T and terminal payoff ξ ∈ L2(GT ) in
this market model. Let (X,Z,K) be the solution of BSDE (2.13). The process X is equal
to the wealth process associated with initial value x = X0, strategy ϕ = Φ(Z,K) (where
Φ is defined in Definition 2.3) that is X = V X0,ϕ. Its initial value X0 = X0(T, ξ) is thus a
sensible price (at time 0) of the claim ξ for the seller since this amount allows him/her to
construct a trading strategy ϕ ∈ H2 ×H2λ, called hedging strategy (for the seller), such that
the value of the associated portfolio is equal to ξ at time T . Moreover, by the uniqueness of
the solution of BSDE (2.13), it is the unique price (at time 0) which satisfies this hedging
property. Similarly, Xt = Xt(T, ξ) satisfies an analogous property at time t, and is called
the hedging price at time t. This leads to a nonlinear pricing system, first introduced by El
Karoui-Quenez ([17]) in a Brownian framework (later called g-evaluation in [24]) and denoted
by Eg. For each S ∈ [0, T ], for each ξ ∈ L2(GS) the associated g-evaluation is defined by
E gt,S(ξ) := Xt(S, ξ) for each t ∈ [0, S].
In order to ensure the (strict) monotonicity and the no arbitrage property of the nonlinear
pricing system Eg, we make the following assumption (see [15, Section 3.3]).
Assumption 2.7. Assume that there exists a bounded map
γ : [0, T ]× Ω× R4 → R ; (ω, t, y, z, k1, k2) 7→ γy,z,k1,k2t (ω)
P ⊗ B(R4)-measurable and satisfying dP ⊗ dt-a.s. , for each (y, z, k1, k2) ∈ R4,
g(t, y, z, k1)− g(t, y, z, k2) ≥ γy,z,k1,k2t (k1 − k2)λt, (2.14)
and P -a.s. , for each (y, z, k1, k2) ∈ R4, γy,z,k1,k2t > −1.
This assumption is satisfied e.g. when g(t, ·) is non decreasing with respect to k, or if g is C1
in k with ∂kg(t, ·) > −λt on {t ≤ ϑ}. In the special case of a perfect market, g is given by
(2.12), which implies that ∂kg(t, ·) = −θ2t λt. In this case, Assumption 2.7 is thus equivalent
to θ2t < 1, which corresponds to the usual assumption (2.6) made in the literature on default
risk.
Remark 2.8. Suppose that g(t, 0, 0, 0) = 0 dP ⊗ dt-a.s. Then the price of an option with
a null payoff is equal to 0, that is, for each S ∈ [0, T ], E g·,S(0) = 0 a.s. Moreover, by the
comparison theorem for BSDEs with default jump (see [15, Theorem 2.17]), it follows that the
nonlinear pricing system E g is nonnegative, that is, for each S ∈ [0, T ], for all ξ ∈ L2(GS),
if ξ ≥ 0 a.s., then E g·,S(ξ) ≥ 0 a.s.
Definition 2.9. Let Y ∈ S2. The process (Yt) is said to be a strong E-supermartingale (resp.
martingale) if Eσ,τ (Yτ) ≤ Yσ (resp. = Yσ) a.s. on σ ≤ τ , for all σ, τ ∈ T0.
Proposition 2.10. For each S ∈ [0, T ] and for each ξ ∈ L2(GS), the associated price (or g-
evaluation) Egt,S(ξ) is an Eg-martingale. Moreover, for each x ∈ R and each portfolio strategy
ϕ ∈ H2 ×H2λ, the associated wealth process V x,ϕ is an Eg-martingale.
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Proof. By the flow property of BSDEs, the solution of a BSDE with driver g is an Eg-
martingale. The first assertion follows. The second one is obtained by noting that V x,ϕ is
the solution of the BSDE with driver g, terminal time T and terminal condition V x,ϕT .
Example 2.11 (Examples of market imperfections).
• Different borrowing and lending interest rates Rt and rt, with Rt ≥ rt: the driver g is
then of the form
g(t, Vt, ϕ
′
tσt,−ϕ2t ) = −rtVt − ϕ1t (µ1t − rt)− ϕ2t (µ2t − rt) + (Rt − rt)(Vt − ϕ1t − ϕ2t )−,
where ϕ2t vanishes after ϑ and (see e.g. [7]).
• Large investor seller: Suppose that the seller of the option is a large trader whose
hedging strategy ϕ and its associated cost V may influence the market prices (see e.g.
[6, 2]). Taking into account the possible feedback effects in the market model, the large
trader-seller may suppose that the coefficients are of the form σt(ω) = σ¯(ω, t, Vt, ϕt)
where σ¯ : Ω × [0, T ] × R3 ; (ω, t, x, z, k) 7→ σ¯(ω, t, x, z, k) is a P ⊗ B(R3)-measurable
map, and similarly for the other coefficients r, µ1, µ2. The driver is thus of the form:
g(t, Vt, ϕ
′
tσ¯t(t, Vt, ϕt),−ϕ2t ) = −r¯(t, Vt, ϕt)Vt−ϕ1t (µ¯1t−r¯t)(t, Vt, ϕt)−ϕ2t (µ¯2t−r¯t)(t, Vt, ϕt).
Here, the map Ψ : (ω, t, y, ϕ) 7→ (z, k) with z = ϕ′σ¯t(ω, t, y, ϕ) and k = −ϕ2 is assumed
to be one to one with respect to ϕ, and such that its inverse Ψ−1ϕ is P ⊗ B(R3)-
measurable.
• Taxes on risky investments profits: Let ρ ∈ ]0, 1[ represents an instantaneous tax coef-
ficient (see e.g. [16]). The driver is then given by:
g(t, Vt, ϕ
′
tσt, ϕ
2
tβt) = −rtVt − ϕ1t (µ1t − rt)− ϕ2t (µ2t − rt) + ρ(ϕ1t + ϕ2t )+.
3 Pricing and hedging of game options in the imperfect
market Mg
Let T > 0 be the terminal time. Let ξ and ζ be adapted RCLL processes in S2 with ζT = ξT
a.s. and ξt ≤ ζt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T a.s. We suppose that Mokobodzki’s condition is satisfied, that is
there exist two nonnegative RCLL supermartingales H and H ′ in S2 such that:
ξt ≤ Ht −H ′t ≤ ζt 0 ≤ t ≤ T a.s.
The game option consists for the seller to select a cancellation time σ ∈ T and for the
buyer to choose an exercise time τ ∈ T , so that the seller pays to the buyer at time τ ∧ σ
the amount
I(τ, σ) := ξτ1τ≤σ + ζσ1σ<τ .
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We now introduce the seller’s price of the game option, denoted by u0, defined as the
infimum of the initial wealths which enable the seller to choose a cancellation time σ and to
construct a portfolio which will cover his liability to pay the payoff to the buyer up to σ no
matter the exercise time chosen by the buyer.
Definition 3.1. For each initial wealth x, a super-hedge against the game option is a pair
(σ, ϕ) of a stopping time σ ∈ T and a portfolio strategy ϕ ∈ H2 ×H2λ such that 1
V
x,ϕ
t ≥ ξt, 0 ≤ t ≤ σ a.s. and V x,ϕσ ≥ ζσ a.s. (3.1)
We denote by S(x) = Sξ,ζ(x) the set of all super-hedges associated with initial wealth x.
We define the seller’s price as
u0 := inf{x ∈ R, ∃(σ, ϕ) ∈ S(x)}. (3.2)
When the infimum in (3.2) is attained, the amount u0 allows the seller to be super-hedged,
and is called the superhedging price.
Remark 3.2. We have (0, 0) ∈ S(ζ0) since V ζ0,00 = ζ0 and ζ0 ≥ ξ0. By (3.2), we thus get
u0 ≤ ζ0.
Moreover, when g(t, 0, 0, 0) = 0 dP ⊗ dt-a.s. and ζ ≥ 0, then we can restrict ourselves
to nonnegative initial wealths, that is u0 = inf{x ≥ 0, ∃(σ, ϕ) ∈ S(x)}. Indeed, let x ∈ R
be such that there exists (σ, ϕ) ∈ S(x). Then, V x,ϕσ ≥ ζσ ≥ 0 a.s. Now, by Proposition 2.10
the wealth process V x,ϕ is an Eg-martingale. We thus have x = Eg0,σ(V x,ϕσ ). Since the pricing
system Eg is nonnegative (see Remark 2.8), it follows that x = Eg0,σ(V x,ϕσ ) ≥ 0.
We now provide a dual formulation of the seller’s price, expressed in terms of the nonlinear
pricing system Eg.We introduce the following definition:
Definition 3.3. We define the g-value of the game option as
inf
σ∈T
sup
τ∈T
Eg0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)]. (3.3)
Our aim is to show that the seller’s price u0 of the game option is equal to its g-value.
To this purpose, we first give the following characterization of the g-value.
Proposition 3.4. (Characterization of the g-value of the game option) Suppose that the
payoffs ξ and ζ are (only) RCLL. The g-value of the game option satisfies:
inf
σ∈T
sup
τ∈T
Eg0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)] = sup
τ∈T
inf
σ∈T
Eg0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)] = Y0, (3.4)
1Note that condition (3.1) is equivalent to V x,ϕt∧σ ≥ I(t, σ), 0 ≤ t ≤ T a.s.
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where (Y, Z,K,A,A′) is the unique solution in S2×H2×H2λ×A2×A2 of the doubly reflected
BSDE (DRBSDE) associated with driver g and barriers ξ, ζ, that is
−dYt = g(t, Yt, Zt, Kt)dt+ dAt − dA′t − ZtdWt −KtdMt; YT = ξT , (3.5)
with
(i) ξt ≤ Yt ≤ ζt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T a.s.,
(ii) dAt ⊥ dA′t (i.e. the measures dAt and dA′t are mutually singular)
(iii)
∫ T
0
(Yt − ξt)dAct = 0 a.s. and
∫ T
0
(ζt − Yt)dA′ct = 0 a.s.
∆Adτ = ∆A
d
τ1{Yτ−=ξτ−} and ∆A
′d
τ = ∆A
′d
τ 1{Yτ−=ζτ−} a.s. ∀τ ∈ T predictable.
Using the terminology introduced in [14], the first equality in (3.4) means that the gen-
eralized Dynkin game associated with the criterium Eg0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)] is fair.
When g is linear and when there is no default, this corresponds to a well-known result
on classical Dynkin games and linear DRBSDEs (see e.g. [8, 18]).
Proof. The proof of existence and uniqueness of a solution (Y, Z,K,A,A′) of the DRBSDE
(3.5) is given in appendix. Proceeding as in the proof of [14, Theorem 4.9] which was
given in the framework of a random Poisson measure, we can prove that for each S ∈ T ,
YS = ess infσ∈TS ess supτ∈TS EgS,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)] = ess supτ∈TS ess infσ∈TS EgS,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)] a.s. The
results of the proposition then follow by taking S = 0.
Proposition 3.5. Let (Y, Z,K,A,A′) be the unique solution of the DRBSDE (3.5). When
ξ (resp. −ζ) is left-u.s.c. along stopping times, then A (resp. A′) is continuous.
Proof. Note first that for each predictable stopping time τ , by (3.5), we have (∆Yτ )
+ = ∆A′τ
a.s. and (∆Yτ )
− = ∆Aτ a.s. Suppose that now that −ζ is left-u.s.c. along stopping time.
Let τ be a predictable stopping time. Using the equality ∆A′τ = (∆Yτ )
+ together with the
Skorokhod conditions satisfied by A′, we get
∆A′τ = 1{Yτ−=ζτ−}(Yτ − Yτ−)+ = 1{Yτ−=ζτ−}(Yτ − ζτ−)+. (3.6)
Now, since −ζ is left-u.s.c. along stopping times, we have Yτ − ζτ− ≤ Yτ − ζτ ≤ 0 a.s. , where
the last equality follows from the inequality Y ≤ ζ . Using (3.6), we derive that ∆A′τ = 0 a.s.
It follows that A′ is continuous. By similar arguments, one can show that if ξ is left-u.s.c.
along stopping times, then A is continuous.
Using the above propositions, we can now show the dual formulation for the seller’s price.
We first consider the simpler case when ζ is left lower-semicontinuous (or equivalently −ζ is
left-u.s.c.) along stopping times. In this case, we prove below that the seller’s price is equal
to the g-value and that the infimum in (3.2) is attained. This implies that the seller’s price
is the super-hedging price. Moreover, a super-hedge strategy is provided via the solution of
the associated DRBSDE.
11
Theorem 3.6 (Seller’s/super-hedging price and super-hedge of the game option). Suppose
that ζ is left lower-semicontinuous along stopping times (and ξ is only RCLL). The seller’s
price (3.2) of the game option coincides with the g-value of the game option, that is
u0 = inf
σ∈T
sup
τ∈T
Eg0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)] = sup
τ∈T
inf
σ∈T
Eg0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)]. (3.7)
Let (Y, Z,K,A,A′) is the solution of the DRBSDE associated with driver g and barriers ξ, ζ.
The seller’s price is equal to Y0, that is
u0 = Y0.
Moreover, the infimum in (3.2) is attained. The seller’s price is thus the super-hedging price
and there exists a super-hedge strategy (σ∗, ϕ∗) associated with the initial amount u0, given
by
σ∗ := inf{t ≥ 0, Yt = ζt} and ϕ∗ := Φ(Z,K), (3.8)
where Φ is defined in Definition 2.3.
Remark 3.7. In the special case of a perfect market model, our result gives that u0 is
characterized as the value function of a classical Dynkin game problem, which is shown in
the literature (see e.g. [23, 18]) under an additional regularity assumption on ξ, by using
an actualization procedure, a change of probability measure, and some results on classical
Dynkin games. Moreover, in this particular case, the characterization of u0 and of the
super-hedge via the solution of a linear doubly reflected BSDE are shown in [18] by using the
links between linear DRBSDEs and classical Dynkin games (first provided in [8]). To solve
the problem in the case of an imperfect market model, when g is nonlinear, we need to use
other arguments, in particular some properties of the nonlinear g-evaluation Eg, comparison
theorems for backward SDEs and for forward differential equations, and the links between
nonlinear doubly reflected BSDEs and generalized Dynkin games (first provided in [14]).
Proof. By Proposition 3.4, the g-value of the game option is equal Y0. Note that u0 = infH,
where H is the set of initial capitals which allow the seller to be super-hedged, that is
H = {x ∈ R : ∃(σ, ϕ) ∈ S(x)}.
Let us show that Y0 ≥ u0. It is sufficient to prove that there exists (σ∗, ϕ∗) ∈ S(Y0). By
Proposition 3.5, since −ζ is left-u.s.c. along stopping times, the process A′ is continuous.
Let σ∗ be defined as in (3.8). We have a.s. that Yt < ζt for each t ∈ [0, σ∗[. Since Y is
solution of the DRBSDE (3.5), the process A′ is thus constant on [0, σ∗[ a.s. and even on
[0, σ∗] by continuity. Hence, A′σ∗ = A
′
0 = 0 a.s. For almost every ω, we thus have
Yt(ω) = Y0 −
∫ t
0
g(s, ω, Ys(ω), Zs(ω), Ks(ω))ds+ ft(ω)−At(ω), 0 ≤ t ≤ σ∗(ω). (3.9)
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where ft :=
∫ t
0
ZsdWs +
∫ t
0
KsdMs. Now, the wealth V
Y0,ϕ
∗
. , associated with the initial
capital Y0 and the financial strategy ϕ
∗ := Φ(Z,K) satisfies for almost every ω the forward
deterministic differential equation:
V
Y0,ϕ
∗
t (ω) = Y0 −
∫ t
0
g(s, V Y0,ϕ
∗
s (ω), Zs(ω), Ks(ω))ds+ ft(ω), 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (3.10)
Since A is non decreasing, by applying the classical comparison result on [0, σ∗(ω)] (see
e.g. Lemma 6.2) for the two forward differential equations (3.9) and (3.10), with the same
coefficient (s, x) 7→ −g(s, ω, x, Zs(ω), Ks(ω)), we get
V
Y0,ϕ
∗
t ≥ Yt ≥ ξt, 0 ≤ t ≤ σ∗ a.s. ,
where the last inequality follows from the inequality Y ≥ ξ. We also have
V
Y0,ϕ
∗
σ∗ ≥ Yσ∗ = ζσ∗ a.s.,
where the last equality follows from the definition of the stopping time σ∗ and the right-
continuity of Y and ζ . Hence,
(σ∗, ϕ∗) ∈ S(Y0), (3.11)
which implies that Y0 ∈ H. We thus get the inequality Y0 ≥ u0.
It remains to show that u0 ≥ Y0. Since Y0 = infσ∈T supτ∈T Eg0,T [I(τ, σ)] (by Proposition
3.4), it is sufficient to show that
u0 ≥ inf
σ∈T
sup
τ∈T
Eg0,T [I(τ, σ)]. (3.12)
Let x ∈ H. There exists (σ, ϕ) ∈ S(x), that is a pair (σ, ϕ) of a stopping time σ ∈ T and
a portfolio strategy ϕ ∈ H2 × H2λ such that V x,ϕt ≥ ξt, 0 ≤ t ≤ σ a.s. and V x,ϕσ ≥ ζσ a.s. ,
which implies that for all τ ∈ T we have
V x,ϕτ∧σ ≥ I(τ, σ) a.s.
By taking the Eg-evaluation in the above inequality and then the supremum on τ ∈ T , using
the monotonicity of the Eg-evaluation and the Eg-martingale property of the wealth process
V x,ϕ (see Proposition 2.10), we obtain x = Eg0,τ∧σ[V x,ϕτ∧σ] ≥ Eg0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)], for each τ ∈ T . By
taking the supremum over τ ∈ T , and then the infimum over σ ∈ T , we get
x ≥ inf
σ∈T
sup
τ∈T
Eg0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)].
This inequality holds for any x ∈ H. By taking the infimum over x ∈ H, we obtain the
inequality (3.12), which yields that u0 ≥ Y0. Since Y0 ≥ u0, we get Y0 = u0. Moreover, this
equality together with (3.11) implies that (σ∗, ϕ∗) ∈ S(u0). The proof is thus complete.
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Remark 3.8. Let σˆ be a stopping time such that A′σˆ = 0 a.s. and Yσˆ = ζσˆ a.s. By the above
proof, the pair (σˆ, ϕ∗) is a super-hedge for the initial amount u0, that is (σˆ, ϕ
∗) ∈ S(u0).
For example, under the assumption of Theorem 3.6 (that is, the left-u.s.c. property along
stopping times of −ζ), the stopping time σ¯ := inf{t ≥ 0 : A′t > 0} satisfies these two
equalities. Note that σ¯ ≥ σ∗. In general, the equality does not hold.
Remark 3.9. Note that under the assumption of Theorem 3.6, there does not necessar-
ily exist a saddle point for the generalized Dynkin game (3.4). However, if we suppose
additionally that ξ is left-u.s.c. along stopping time, there exists a saddle point. More pre-
cisely, in this case, by [14, Theorem 4.7], the pair (τ ∗, σ∗), with σ∗ defined in (3.8) and
τ ∗ := inf{t ≥ 0 : Yt = ξt}, is a saddle point for the generalized Dynkin game (3.4), that is,
for all (τ, σ) ∈ T 2 we have
Eg0,τ∧σ∗ [I(τ, σ∗)] ≤ Y0 = Eg0,τ∗∧σ∗ [I(τ ∗, σ∗)] ≤ Eg0,τ∗∧σ[I(τ ∗, σ)],
which implies that τ ∗ is optimal for the optimal stopping problem supτ∈T Eg[I(τ, σ∗)].
The same properties also hold for the pair (τ¯ , σ¯) where τ¯ := inf{t ≥ 0 : At > 0}.
We consider now the general case when ζ is only RCLL (as ξ). In this case, the seller’s
price u0 is still equal to the g-value but it does not necessarily allow the seller to build a
super-hedge against the option. We introduce the definition of ε-super-hedges:
Definition 3.10. For each initial wealth x and for each ε > 0, an ε-super-hedge against
the game option is a pair (σ, ϕ) of a stopping time σ ∈ T and a risky-assets strategy ϕ ∈
H2 ×H2λ such that
V
x,ϕ
t ≥ ξt, 0 ≤ t ≤ σ a.s. and V x,ϕσ ≥ ζσ − ε a.s.
In other terms, by investing the initial capital amount x in the market following the risky-
assets strategy ϕ, the seller is completely hedged before σ, and at the cancellation time σ, he
is hedged up to an amount of ε.
We prove below that when ζ and ξ are only RCLL, the seller’s price u0 is equal to the
g-value and that there exits an ε-super-hedge for the game option.
Theorem 3.11 (Seller’s price and ε-super-hedge of the game option). Suppose that the
process ζ and ξ are only RCLL. The seller’s price (3.2) of the game option coincides with
the g-value of the game option, that is
u0 = inf
σ∈T
sup
τ∈T
Eg0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)] = sup
τ∈T
inf
σ∈T
Eg0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)].
Let (Y, Z,K,A,A′) be the solution of the DRBSDE associated with driver g and barriers ξ, ζ.
The seller’s price is equal to Y0, that is
u0 = Y0. (3.13)
The infimum in (3.2) is not nessarily attained. Let ϕ∗ := Φ(Z,K) and for each ε > 0, let
σε := inf{t ≥ 0 : Yt ≥ ζt − ε}. (3.14)
The pair (σε, ϕ
∗) is an ε-super-hedge for the initial capital u0.
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Proof. By Proposition 3.4, the g-value is equal Y0. Let ε > 0. We have Y. ≤ ζ.− ε on [0, σε[.
Since A′ satisfies the Skorohod condition (iii), it follows that almost surely, A′ is constant
on [0, σε[. Also, Y(σε)− ≤ ζ(τε)− − ε a.s. , which implies that ∆A′σε = 0 a.s. Hence, A′σε = 0
a.s. It follows that for almost every ω, the deterministic function Y.(ω) is the solution of
the forward deterministic differential equation (3.9) on [0, σε(ω)]. Now, for almost every
ω, the wealth V Y0,ϕ
∗
. (ω) is the solution of the deterministic differential equation (3.10). By
applying the classical comparison result on differential equations (Lemma 6.2), we derive
that V Y0,ϕ
∗
t ≥ Yt ≥ ξt, 0 ≤ t ≤ σε a.s. Moreover, we have V Y0,ϕ∗σε ≥ Yσε ≥ ζσε − ε, where the
last inequality follows from definition of the stopping time σε and the right-continuity of Y
and ζ . Hence, (σε, ϕ
∗) is an ε-super-hedge for the initial capital amount Y0.
It remains to show that Y0 = u0. The proof of the inequality u0 ≥ Y0, which uses
Proposition 3.4, has been done in the second part of the proof of Theorem 3.6 and does
not require the continuity of A′. Let us show the converse inequality. Let ε > 0. Let
(Y ′, Z ′, K ′) be the solution of the BSDE associated with terminal time σε and terminal
condition ζσε ∨ V Y0,ϕ∗σε . Now (V Y0,ϕ
∗
, Z,K) is the solution of the BSDE associated with
terminal time σε and terminal condition V
Y0,ϕ
∗
σε
. By an a priori estimate on BSDEs with
default jump (see [15, Proposition 2.4]), since V Y0,ϕ
∗
σε
≥ ζσε ∨ V Y0,ϕ∗σε − ε a.s. , we derive that
V
Y0,ϕ
∗
0 = Y0 ≥ Y ′0 − Kε a.s. , where K is a constant which only depends on T and the
λ-constant C. By the comparison theorem for BSDEs, Y ′t ≥ V Y0,ϕ
∗
t ≥ ξt. We derive that the
amount Y ′0 (≤ Y0+Kε) allows the seller to be super-hedged, and the associated super-hedge
is given by σε and ϕ
′ := Φ(Z ′, K ′). By definition of u0, we derive that u0 ≤ Y ′0 ≤ Y0 +Kε,
for each ε > 0. Hence, u0 ≤ Y0. Since u0 ≥ Y0, we get u0 = Y0.
4 Pricing and hedging of game options with model un-
certainty
We study now game options with uncertainty on the model, which includes in particular the
case of uncertainty on the default probability (see Example 4.3 below).
4.1 Market model with ambiguity
In this section, we need to use a measurable selection theorem, which requires to work on an
appropriate probability space. We consider a Cox process model, which is a typical example
of default model. We work on the canonical space constructed as follows: let ΩW be the
Wiener space defined by ΩW := C(R+), that is the set of continuous functions ω from R+ into
R such that ω(0) = 0. Recall that ΩW is a Polish space for the norm ‖ · ‖∞. The space ΩW
is equipped with the σ-algebra FW generated by the coordinate process (Wt)t≥0 (which is
equal to its Borelian σ-algebra). Let PW be the probability under which (Wt)t≥0 is a standard
Brownian motion. Let ΩΘ := R, equipped with its Borelian σ-algebra FΘ = B(R), and the
probability PΘ such that the identity map Θ admits an exponential law with parameter 1.
We consider the product space Ω := ΩW × ΩΘ, which is a Polish space. It is equipped with
15
the σ-algebra FW ⊗FΘ, and the probability P := PW ⊗PΘ. Let G be the σ-algebra FW ⊗FΘ
completed with respect to P . Let F = (Ft, t ≥ 0) be the filtration FW completed with
respect to G and P (in the sense of [20, p.3] or [9, IV]). Let (λ¯t)t≥0 be a bounded positive
F-predictable process. We introduce the following random variable, which represents the
default time:
ϑ := inf{t ≥ 0,
∫ t
0
λ¯sds ≥ Θ}.
We have P (ϑ > t | F∞) = P (ϑ > t | Ft) = exp(−
∫ t
0
λ¯sds), which corresponds to the so-called
condition (H) (see e.g. [19]). We now define the default process:
Nt := 1{ϑ≤t} , t ≥ 0.
We denote by G = (Gt, t ≥ 0) the filtration generated by W and N augmented with respect
to G and P (in the sense of [9, IV-48]). By classical results, since Condition (H) holds, we
derive that W is a G-Brownian motion. Moreover, the process M defined by
Mt := Nt −
∫ t∧ϑ
0
λ¯sds, t ≥ 0, a.s.
is a G-martingale. For each t ≥ 0, let λt := λ¯t 1{t≤ϑ}. The process λ, usually called the
G-intensity of ϑ, thus vanishes after ϑ. Let T be a given terminal time. The sets P, S2, H2,
H2λ and A2 are defined as before.
Let U be a nonempty closed subset of R. Let g : [0, T ]×Ω×R3×U → R ; (t, ω, y, z, k, α) 7→
g(t, ω, y, z, k, α), be a given P ⊗ B(R3)⊗ B(U)-measurable function. Suppose g(·, α) is uni-
formly λ- admissiblewith respect to (y, z, k), that satisfies the inequality (2.8) with a constant
C which does not depend on α. We also assume that g(·, α) is continuous with respect to α,
and such that supα∈U |g(t, ., 0, 0, 0, α)| ∈ H2. Suppose also that
g(t, y, z, k1, α)− g(t, y, z, k2, α) ≥ θy,z,k1,k2t (k1 − k2)λt, (4.1)
where θy,z,k1,k2t satisfies the conditions of Assumption 2.7, in particular the inequality θ
y,z,k1,k2
t >
−1.
Let U be the set of U -valued predictable processes. For each α ∈ U , to simplify notation,
we introduce the map gα defined by
gα(t, ω, y, z, k) := g(t, ω, y, z, k, αt(ω)). (4.2)
Note that these maps gα, α ∈ U , are all λ-admissible drivers with the same λ-constant
C. The control α represents the ambiguity parameter of the model. To each ambiguity
parameter α, corresponds a market model Mα where the wealth process V α,x,ϕ associated
with an initial wealth x and a risky assets stategy ϕ ∈ H2 ×H2λ satisfies
−dV α,x,ϕt = g(t, V α,x,ϕt , ϕtσt,−ϕ2t , αt)dt− ϕtσtdWt + ϕ2tdMt ; V α,x,ϕ0 = x. (4.3)
In the market model Mα, the nonlinear pricing system is given by Egα := {Eg
α
t,S, S ∈
[0, T ], t ∈ [0, S]}, also called gα-evaluation.
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4.2 Robust superhedging of game options
In our framework with ambiguity, the seller’s robust price of the game option denoted by u0
is defined as the infimum of the initial wealths which enable the seller to be superhedged for
any ambiguity parameter α ∈ U .
Definition 4.1. For an initial wealth x ∈ R, a robust super-hedge against the game option
is a pair (σ, ϕ) of a stopping time σ ∈ T and a portfolio strategy ϕ ∈ H2 ×H2λ such that 2
V
α,x,ϕ
t ≥ ξt, 0 ≤ t ≤ σ a.s. and V α,x,ϕσ ≥ ζσ a.s. , ∀α ∈ U . (4.4)
We denote by Sr(x) the set of all robust super-hedges associated with initial wealth x.
The seller’s robust price is defined as 3
u0 := inf{x ∈ R, ∃(σ, ϕ) ∈ Sr(x)}. (4.5)
When the infimum is reached, u0 is called the robust superhedging price.
Let α ∈ U . By Theorem 3.11, the seller’s price of the game option in the market Mα is
characterized as its gα-value. Moreover, it is equal to Y α0 , where (Y
α, Zα, Kα, Aα, A
′α) is the
unique solution in S2 × H2 × H2λ × A2 ×A2 of the DRBSDE associated with driver gα and
barriers ξ and ζ . We now introduce an associated dual problem.
Definition 4.2. The dual problem associated to the seller’s super-hedging problem is
v0 := sup
α∈U
Y α0 . (4.6)
By Theorem 3.11, the seller’s price Y α0 of the game option in the market Mα is equal to
the common value function of the generalized Dynkin game associated with driver gα, that
is,
Y α0 = inf
σ∈T
sup
τ∈T
Egα0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)] = sup
τ∈T
inf
σ∈T
Egα0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)].
Hence, the value function v0 of the dual problem is equal to the value function of a mixed
generalized Dynkin game, that is
v0 = sup
α∈U
Y α0 = sup
α∈U
inf
σ∈T
sup
τ∈T
Egα0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)] = sup
α∈U
sup
τ∈T
inf
σ∈T
Egα0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)]. (4.7)
Remark 4.3. We shall see below (see Proposition 4.8) that v0 is also equal to:
inf
σ∈T
sup
α∈U
sup
τ∈T
Egα0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)].
2Condition (4.4) is equivalent to V α,x,ϕt∧σ ≥ I(t, σ), 0 ≤ t ≤ T a.s. for all α ∈ U .
3 Remark 3.2 also holds for the seller’s robust price, that is, u0 ≤ ζ0. Moreover, when g(t, 0, 0, 0) = 0 and
ζ ≥ 0, then u0 = inf{x ≥ 0, ∃(σ, ϕ) ∈ Sr(x)}.
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In order to show that u0 = v0, we will first prove that v0 can be characterized as the
solution of a doubly reflected BSDE.
Now, by definition, we have v0 = supα Y
α
0 , where Y
α is the solution of the doubly
reflected BSDE associated with barriers ξ and ζ , and with driver g(·, αt). We will show
that v0 coincides with the solution of the doubly reflected BSDE associated with the same
barriers ξ and ζ , and with the driver supα g(·, α).
More precisely, let G be the map defined for each (t, ω, z, k) by
G(t, ω, y, z, k) := sup
α∈U
g(t, ω, y, z, k, α). (4.8)
Lemma 4.4. The map G is a λ-admissible driver and satisfies Assumption 2.7.
Proof. Since U is a closed subset of a Polish space, there exists a numerable subset D of U ,
dense in U . Since g is continuous with respect to u, the supremum in (4.8) can be taken in
D. It follows that G is P ⊗ B(R3)− measurable. Let us show that G satisfies Assumption
(2.7). By definition of G(t, y, z, k1) and by Assumption (4.1), we have for all α ∈ U :
G(t, y, z, k1)− g(t, y, z, k2, α) ≥ g(t, y, z, k1, α)− g(t, y, z, k2, α) ≥ θy,z,k1,k2t (k1 − k2)λt.
Taking the infimum on α ∈ U in this inequality, and using the definition of G(t, y, z, k2), we
derive that G(t, y, z, k1)−G(t, y, z, k2) ≥ θy,z,k1,k2t (k1− k2)λt, which gives the desired result.
The proof of condition (2.8) relies on similar arguments and is left to the reader. Hence, G
is a λ-admissible driver.
We now prove that the dual function v0 is characterized as the solution of the doubly
reflected BSDE associated with driver G and barriers ξ and ζ .
Theorem 4.5. (Characterization of the dual value function v0) Let v0 be defined by (4.6).
We have v0 = Y0, where (Y, Z,K,A,A
′) be the solution of the DRBSDE associated with
driver G and barriers ξ and ζ. If U is compact, there exists α¯ ∈ U such that v0 = Y α¯0 ,
which means that the dual value function v0 is equal to the g
α¯-value of the game option in
the market model Mα¯.
Proof. By definition of G (see (4.8)), for each (t, ω, y, z, k) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω× R3 × U , we have
G(t, ω, y, z, k) ≥ g(t, ω, y, z, k, αt(ω)).
By the comparison theorem for DRBSDEs (see Theorem 5.1 in [14]), we thus have Y ≥ Y α
a.s. for each α ∈ U . It follows that Y0 ≥ supα Y α0 .
Let ε > 0. By definition of G as a supremum, for each (t, ω, y, z, l) ∈ Ω × [0, T ] × R2 × R,
there exists αε ∈ U such that G(t, ω, y, z, k)− ε ≤ g(t, ω, y, z, k, αε). Now, the set
{(t, ω, α) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω×U : G(t, ω, Yt−(ω), Zt(ω), Kt(ω))−ε ≤ g(t, ω, Yt−(ω), Zt(ω), Kt(ω), α)}
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belongs to P ⊗ B(U). Hence, since the canonical space Ω is a Polish space, by applying a
measurable selection theorem (see e.g. [9, Section 81, Appendix of Ch. III]) and [5, Lemma
1.2] (or [13, Lemma 26]), there exists an U -valued predictable process (αεt ) such that
G(t, Yt, Zt, Kt)− ε ≤ g(t, ω, Yt, Zt, Kt, αεt ), 0 ≤ t ≤ T, dt⊗ dP − a.s.
By using the estimate (6.1) on DRBSDEs with default jump, with η = 1
C2
and β = 3C2+2C,
we derive that there exists a constant K ≥ 0, which depends only on C and T , such that,
for each ε > 0,
Y0 −K ε ≤ Y αε0 .
Since Y0 ≥ supα Y α0 , we thus get Y0 = supα Y α0 = v0.
Let us show the second assertion. If U is compact, for each (t, ω, y, z, l) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω×R2×L2λ,
there exists α¯ ∈ U such that the supremum in (4.8) is attained at α¯. By the measurable
selection theorem of [9] and [5, Lemma 1.2], there exists an U -valued predictable process
(α¯t) such that
G(t, Yt, Zt, Kt) = g(t, Yt, Zt, Kt, α¯t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T, dt⊗ dP − a.s.
It follows that Y and Y α¯ are both solutions of the DRBSDE associated with driver gα¯.
Hence, by the uniqueness of the solution of a DRBSDE, Y = Y α¯.
Using this result, we now provide the following theorem:
Theorem 4.6. (Seller’s robust price and super-hedge) Suppose that ζ is left-lower semicon-
tinuous along stopping times (and ξ is only RCLL). The seller’s robust price of the game
option defined by (4.5) is equal the dual value function v0 defined by (4.6), that is
u0 = v0.
Let (Y, Z,K,A,A′) be the solution of the DRBSDE associated with driver G defined by (4.8)
and barriers ξ and ζ. The seller’s robust price is equal to Y0, that is
u0 = Y0.
Moreover, the infimum in (4.6) is attained. The robust seller’s price is thus the robust super-
hedging price of the game option. Let σ∗ := inf{t ≥ 0, Yt = ζt} and ϕ∗ := Φ(Z,K). The
pair (σ∗, ϕ∗) is a robust super-hedge for the initial capital u0.
If U is compact, there exists α¯ ∈ U such that the robust superhedging price of the game
option is equal to the superhedging price in the market model Mα¯, that is u0 = Y α¯0 . The
ambiguity parameter α¯ corresponds to a worst case scenario among all the possible ambiguity
parameters α ∈ U .
Proof. By Theorem 4.5, v0 = Y0. Let Hr be the set of initial capitals which allow the seller
to be super-hedged, that is Hr = {x ∈ R : ∃(σ, ϕ) ∈ Sr(x)}. Note that u0 = infHr.
Let us show that Y0 ≥ u0. It is sufficient to show that there exists (σ∗, ϕ∗) ∈ Sr(Y0). By
Proposition 3.5, since −ζ is left-u.s.c. along stopping times, the process A′ is continuous. By
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definition of σ∗, the process A′ is constant on [0, σ∗[ a.s. and even on [0, σ∗] by continuity.
Hence, A′σ∗ = A
′
0 = 0 a.s. We thus have
Yt = Y0 −
∫ t
0
G(s, Ys, Zs, Ks)ds+
∫ t
0
ZsdWs +
∫ t
0
KsdMs − At, 0 ≤ t ≤ σ∗ a.s.
Let α ∈ U . In the market model Mα, the wealth process V α,Y0,ϕ∗. associated with the initial
capital Y0 and the financial strategy ϕ
∗ := Φ(Z,K) satisfies
V
α,Y0,ϕ
∗
t = Y0 −
∫ t
0
g(s, V α,Y0,ϕ
∗
s , Zs, Ks, αs)ds+
∫ t
0
ZsdWs +
∫ t
0
KsdMs.
By definition of G (see (4.8)), we have −g(t, ω, y, z, k, αt(ω)) ≥ −G(t, ω, y, z, k). Hence,
since A is a non decreasing process, by the comparison property for deterministic differential
equations (see Lemma 6.2) applied to the two above forward equations, we derive that
V
α,Y0,ϕ
∗
t ≥ Yt ≥ ξt, 0 ≤ t ≤ σ∗ a.s. ,
where the last inequality follows from the inequality Y ≥ ξ.
Moreover, we have V α,Y0,ϕ
∗
σ∗ ≥ Yσ∗ = ζσ∗ a.s. , and this holds for any α ∈ U . Hence (σ∗, ϕ∗) ∈
Sr(Y0), which implies Y0 ∈ Hr. Thus, Y0 ≥ u0.
Let us now show that u0 ≥ Y0. Let x ∈ Hr. There exists (σ, ϕ) ∈ Sr(x), that is a pair
(σ, ϕ) of a stopping time σ ∈ T and a portfolio strategy ϕ ∈ H2 × H2λ such that for each
α ∈ U , we have V α,x,ϕt∧σ ≥ I(t, σ), 0 ≤ t ≤ T a.s. By the same arguments as in the proof of
Theorem 3.6, we derive that for each α ∈ U ,
x ≥ inf
σ∈T
sup
τ∈T
Egα0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)].
By taking the supremum over α ∈ U in this inequality, we obtain
x ≥ sup
α∈U
inf
σ∈T
sup
τ∈T
Egα0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)] = v0,
where the last equality follows from the fact that v0 is equal to the value function of the
mixed generalized Dynkin game (4.7). By taking the infimum over x ∈ Hr, we obtain
u0 ≥ v0 = Y0. Since Y0 ≥ u0, we thus get Y0 = u0. Since (σ∗, ϕ∗) ∈ Sr(Y0), we derive that
(σ∗, ϕ∗) ∈ Sr(u0). The last assertion of the theorem follows from Theorem 4.5.
When ζ is only RCLL, by using similar arguments to those used in the above proof and
in the proof of Theorem 3.11, one can show the following result.
Theorem 4.7. [seller’s robust price and ε-super-hedge] Suppose that the process ζ and ξ are
only RCLL. The seller’s robust price of the game option is equal the dual value function, that
is u0 = v0. We also have u0 = Y0, where (Y, Z,K,A,A
′) is the solution of the DRBSDE
associated with driver G defined by (4.8) and barriers ξ and ζ.
Moreover, the infimum in (4.6) is not necessarily attained. For each ε > 0, let σε :=
inf{t ≥ 0 : Yt ≥ ζt−ε}. The pair (σε, ϕ∗), where ϕ∗ := Φ(Z,K), is an ε-robust super-hedge
for the seller, in the sense that
V
α,u0,ϕ
∗
t ≥ ξt, 0 ≤ t ≤ σε a.s. and V α,u0,ϕ
∗
σε
≥ ζσε − ε a.s. ∀α ∈ U .
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We will now show that the infimum over σ and the supremum over α can be interchanged
in the expression of the dual value function v0 (see (4.7)), which, since u0 = v0, can be
written as follows.
Proposition 4.8. The seller’s robust price u0 of the game option satisfies:
u0 = sup
α∈U
inf
σ∈T
sup
τ∈T
Egα0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)] = inf
σ∈T
sup
α∈U
sup
τ∈T
Egα0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)]. (4.9)
Proof. The first equality in (4.9) holds by the above theorem. Let us prove the second
one. By the above theorem, we have u0 = Y0, where (Y, Z,K,A,A
′) is the solution of the
DRBSDE associated with driver G defined by (4.8) and barriers ξ and ζ . To obtain the
desired result, it is thus sufficient to prove that
Y0 = inf
σ∈T
sup
α∈U
sup
τ∈T
Egα0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)]. (4.10)
Since by definition (4.8), G = supα∈U g(·, α), by using similar arguments to those used in
the proof of Theorem 4.5 (in particular a measurable selection theorem), one can show that
the solution of the BSDE associated with driver G and terminal condition I(τ, σ) is equal
to the supremum over α of the solutions of the BSDEs associated with drivers g(·, α) and
the same terminal condition, that is
EG0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)] = sup
α∈U
Egα0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)]. (4.11)
On the other hand, applying Proposition 3.4 to the generalized Dynkin game associated with
driver G, we obtain the equality
Y0 = inf
σ∈T
sup
τ∈T
EG0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)]. (4.12)
Combining (4.11) and (4.12), we obtain the desired equality (4.10).
4.3 Application to the case of ambiguity on the default probability
We consider a family of a priori probability measures parametrized by α ∈ U . More precisely,
for each α ∈ U , letQα be the probability measure equivalent to P , which admits ZαT as density
with respect to P , where (Zαt ) is the solution of the following SDE:
dZαt = Z
α
t ν(t, αt)dMt; Z
α
0 = 1,
where ν : (ω, t, α) 7→ ν(t, ω, α) is a bounded P ⊗ B(U)-measurable function defined on
Ω× [0, T ]× U with ν(t, α) > C1 > −1.
By Girsanov’s theorem, we derive that under Qα, W is a G-Brownian motion and Mαt :=
Nt−
∫ t
0
λs(1+ν(s, αs))ds is a G-martingale. Hence, under Q
α, the G-default intensity is equal
to λt(1 + ν(t, αt)). The process ν(t, αt) represents the uncertainty on the default intensity.
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To each α ∈ U , corresponds a market model Mα associated with the a priori probability
measure Qα. In the market Mα, the dynamics of the wealth process V α,x,ϕ associated with
an initial wealth x and a risky assets stategy ϕ ∈ H2 ×H2λ are supposed to satisfy
− dV α,x,ϕt = f(t, V α,x,ϕt , ϕ′tσt,−ϕ2t , αt)dt− ϕ′tσtdWt + ϕ2tdMαt ; V α,x,ϕ0 = x, (4.13)
where f : (t, ω, y, z, k, α) 7→ f(t, ω, y, z, k, α) is a map supposed to be uniformly λ- ad-
missible with respect to (y, z, k), satisfying (4.1) with θt,y,z,k1,k2 > (−1 − C1) ∨ (−1) and
supα∈U |f(t, ., 0, 0, 0, α)| ∈ Hp, for some p > 2. For example, f can be given as in (2.12) in
the case of a perfect market, or as in Examples 2.11 of market imperfections, with coefficients
which may depend on α.
By [15, Proposition A.3], there is a martingale representation theorem for G-martingales
under Qα with respect to W and Mα. Let ξ ∈ Lp(GT ), where p > 2. By [15, Proposition
2.11], the density ZαT of Q
α with respect to P belongs to Lq for all q ≥ 2. Let p′ ∈]2, p[.
Applying Ho¨lder’s inequality, we derive that EQα(ξ
p′) < +∞. Similarly, since by assumption
f(t, 0, 0, 0, αt) ∈ Hp, we derive that f(t, 0, 0, 0, αt) ∈ Hp
′
Qα . By [15, Corollary A.4], there exists
an unique solution (Xα, Zα, Kα) in Sp′Qα ×Hp
′
Qα ×Hp
′
Qα,λ of the following Q
α-BSDE:
− dXαt = f(t, Xαt , Zαt , Kαt , αt)dt− Zαt dWt −Kαt dMαt ; XαT = ξ. (4.14)
As in the previous section, to simplify notation, for each α ∈ U , we denote by fα the driver
fα(t, y, z, k) = f(t, y, z, k, αt). The nonlinear price system in the market modelMα, denoted
by EfαQα, is thus the fα-evaluation under the a priori probability measure Qα, defined on Lp
′
.
The robust super-hedges are defined as in Definition 4.1 and the seller’s robust price u0 is
defined by (4.5).
Since Mαt =Mt−
∫ t
0
λsν(s, αs)ds, the dynamics (4.13) of the wealth process V
α,x,ϕ in the
market model Mα can be written as follows:
−dV α,x,ϕt = −λtν(t, αt)ϕ2tdt+ f(t, V α,x,ϕt , ϕtσt,−ϕ2t , αt)dt− ϕtσtdWt + ϕ2tdMt.
This example thus corresponds to the model with ambiguity defined in Section 4.1 with
g(·, α) defined by
g(t, ω, y, z, k, α) := λt(ω)ν(t, ω, α)k + f(t, ω, y, z, k, α).
By the assumptions on f , the map g satisfies the required conditions, in particular inequality
(4.1). Theorems 4.6 and 4.7 as well as Proposition 4.8 hold. In particular, the seller’s robust
price u0 of the game option admits the following dual representation:
u0 = sup
α∈U
inf
σ∈T
sup
τ∈T
Egα0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)] = inf
σ∈T
sup
α∈U
sup
τ∈T
Egα0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)]. (4.15)
We now show that for each α ∈ U , Egα is equal to the nonlinear price system EfαQα relative
to the market model Mα. First, we have (ZαT )−1 ∈ Lq for all q ≥ 1. Indeed, The process
(Zαt )
−1 satisfies the following Qα-SDE: d(Zαt )
−1 = −(Zαt−)−1ν(t, αt)dMαt , with (Zα0 )−1 = 1.
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By [15, Proposition 2.11], (ZαT )
−1 belongs to Lq
′
Qα for all q
′ ≥ 1, which implies that (ZαT )−1 ∈
Lq for all q ≥ 1. Since p′ > 2, by Ho¨lder’s inequality, we derive that (Xα, Zα, Kα) (solution
of (4.14)) belongs to S2 ×H2 × H2λ and is thus the unique solution in S2 × H2 × H2λ of the
P -BSDE:
−dXαt = gα(t, Xαt , Zαt , Kαt )dt− Zαt dWt −Kαt dMt; XαT = ξ.
Hence, for each maturity S and each payoff η ∈ Lp(GS), we have
EfαQα,·,S(η) = Eg
α
·,S(η),
which gives that Egα is equal to the nonlinear price system EfαQα relative to the market model
Mα. Using this property together with equalities (4.15) and Theorem 4.7, we derive the
following result.
Proposition 4.9. (Seller’s robust price) The seller’s robust price of the game option in this
model admits the following dual representation:
u0 = sup
α∈U
inf
σ∈T
sup
τ∈T
EfαQα,0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)] = inf
σ∈T
sup
α∈U
sup
τ∈T
EfαQα,0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)]. (4.16)
Let G be the map defined for each (t, ω, z, k) by
G(t, ω, y, z, k) := sup
α∈U
(λt(ω)ν(t, ω, α)k + f(t, ω, y, z, k, α)) . (4.17)
We have u0 = Y0, where Y is the solution of the P -DRBSDE associated with driver G and
barriers ξ and ζ.
5 Complementary results
5.1 Pricing of European options from the buyer’s point of view
Let us consider the pricing and hedging problem of a European option with maturity T and
payoff ξ ∈ L2(GT ) from the buyer’s point of view. Supposing the initial price of the option
is z, he starts with the amount −z at time t = 0, and looks to find a risky-assets strategy ϕ˜
such that the payoff that he receives at time T allows him to recover the debt he incurred
at time t = 0 by buying the option, that is such that V −z,ϕ˜T + ξ = 0 a.s. or equivalently,
V
−z,ϕ˜
T = −ξ a.s.
The buyer’s price of the option is thus equal to the opposite of the seller’s price of
the option with payoff −ξ, that is −E g0,T (−ξ) = −X˜0, where (X˜, Z˜, K˜) is the solution of
the BSDE associated with driver g and terminal condition −ξ. Let us specify the hedging
strategy for the buyer. Suppose that the initial price of the option is z := −X˜0. The process
X˜ is equal to the value of the portfolio associated with initial value −z = X˜0 and strategy
ϕ˜ := Φ(Z˜, K˜) (where Φ is defined in Definition 2.3) that is X˜ = V X˜0,ϕ˜ = V −z,ϕ˜. Hence,
V
−z,ϕ˜
T = X˜T = −ξ a.s. , which yields that ϕ˜ is the hedging risky-assets strategy for the buyer.
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Similarly, −E gt,T (−ξ) = −X˜t satisfies an analogous property at time t, and is is called the
hedging price for the buyer at time t.
This leads to the nonlinear pricing system E˜ g relative to the buyer in the market Mg
defined for each (S, ξ) ∈ [0, T ]× L2(GS) by
E˜ g·,S(ξ) := −E
g
·,S(−ξ). (5.1)
Remark 5.1. When g(t, 0, 0, 0) = 0, then E˜ g·,S(0) = 0. Moreover, by the comparison theorem
for BSDEs with default, if ξ ≥ 0, then E˜ g·,S(ξ) ≥ 0.
Note that E˜ g·,S(ξ) is equal to the solution of the BSDE with driver −g(t,−y,−z,−k) and
terminal condition ξ. Hence, if we suppose that −g(t,−y,−z,−k) ≤ g(t, y, z, k) (which is
satisfied if, for example, g is convex with respect to (y, z, k)), then, by the comparison theorem
for BSDEs, we have E˜ g·,S(ξ) = −E g·,S(−ξ) ≤ E g·,S(ξ) for each (S, ξ) ∈ [0, T ]× L2(GS). 4
Moreover, when −g(t,−y,−z,−k) = g(t, y, z, k) (which is satisfied if, for example, g is
linear with respect to (y, z, k), as in the perfect market case), we have E˜ g = E g .
5.2 Pricing of the game option from the buyer’s point of view
In this section, we consider the point of view of the buyer of the game option. Supposing
the initial price of the game option is z, he starts with the amount −z at time t = 0, and
looks to find a super-hedge, that is an exercise time τ and a risky-assets strategy ϕ, such
that the payoff that he receives allows him to recover the debt he incurred at time t = 0 by
buying the game option, no matter the cancellation time chosen by the seller. This notion
of super-hedge for the buyer can be defined more precisely as follows.
Definition 5.2. A buyer’s super-hedge against the game option with initial price z ∈ R is
a pair (τ, ϕ) of a stopping time τ ∈ T and a risky-assets strategy ϕ ∈ H2 ×H2λ such that
V
−z,ϕ
t ≥ −ζt, 0 ≤ t < τ a.s. and V −z,ϕτ ≥ −ξτ a.s. (5.2)
We denote by Bξ,ζ(z) the set of all buyer’s super-hedges against the game option with payoffs
(ξ, ζ) associated with initial price z ∈ R.
The buyer’s price of the game option in the market model Mg, denoted by u˜0, is defined
as the supremum of the initial prices which allow the buyer to be super-hedged, that is 5
u˜0 := sup{z ∈ R, ∃(τ, ϕ) ∈ Bξ,ζ(z)}. (5.3)
The first inequality of (5.2) also holds at time t = τ because ξ ≤ ζ . It follows that
Bξ,ζ(z) = S−ζ,−ξ(−z), where S−ζ,−ξ(−z) is the set of seller’s super-hedges against the game
option with payoffs (−ζ,−ξ) associated with initial capital −z.
Hence, −u˜0 = inf{x ∈ R, ∃(τ, ϕ) ∈ S−ζ,−ξ(x)}. We thus have:
4Note that a price functional p generally satisfies −p(−ξ) ≤ p(ξ)(see e.g. [21] Section 2).
5 We have (0, 0) ∈ Bξ,ζ(ξ0). Hence, u˜0 ≥ ξ0. Moreover, similarly to Remark 3.2, if g(t, 0, 0, 0) = 0 and
ξ0 ≥ 0, then u˜0 = sup{z ≥ 0, ∃(τ, ϕ) ∈ Bξ,ζ(z)}.
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Theorem 5.3. The buyer’s price of the game option with payoffs (ξ, ζ) is equal to the
opposite of the seller’s price of the game option with payoffs (−ζ,−ξ).
The previous results (Theorem 3.6 and Theorem 3.11) can thus be applied. In particular,
we have the following dual formulation of the buyer’s price:
u˜0 = sup
τ∈T
inf
σ∈T
E˜g0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)] = inf
σ∈T
sup
τ∈T
E˜g0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)], (5.4)
where E˜g0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)] = −Eg0,τ∧σ[−I(τ, σ)]. The quantity E˜g0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)] corresponds to the
buyer’s price of the European option with payoff I(τ, σ) and terminal time τ ∧ σ (see (5.1)).
Remark 5.4. In the special case of a perfect market, the dynamics of the wealth process
X are linear with respect to (X,ϕ), which implies that the buyer’s price u˜0 is equal to the
seller’s price u0 (and E˜ g = E g , as seen in Remark 5.1).
Let (Y˜ , Z˜, K˜, A˜, A˜′) be the solution of the DRBSDE associated with driver g and barriers
(−ζ,−ξ). By Theorem 3.11, the buyer’s price is equal to the opposite of the solution, that
is, u˜0 = −Y˜0.
Moreover, by Theorem 3.6, when ξ is left-u.s.c. along stopping times (but not necessarily
−ζ), the pair (τ˜ , ϕ˜), where τ˜ := inf{t ≥ 0 : −Y˜t = ξt} and ϕ˜ := Φ(Z˜, K˜), is a buyer’s
super-hedge.
Buyer’s robust price of the game option in the case with ambiguity. In this
paragraph, we consider the market model with ambiguity described in Section 4.1.
Definition 5.5. A buyer’s robust super-hedge against the game option with initial price
z ∈ R is a pair (τ, ϕ) of a stopping time τ ∈ T and a strategy ϕ ∈ H2 ×H2λ such that
V
α,z,ϕ
t ≥ −ζt, 0 ≤ t < τ a.s. and V α,z,ϕτ ≥ −ξτ a.s. , ∀α ∈ U . (5.5)
We denote by Brξ,ζ(z) the set of all buyer’s robust super-hedges against the game option with
payoffs (ξ, ζ) associated with initial price z ∈ R.
The buyer’s robust price of the game option is defined as the supremum of the initial
prices which allow the buyer to construct a robust superhedge, that is
u˜0 := sup{z ∈ R, ∃(τ, ϕ) ∈ Brξ,ζ(z)}. (5.6)
Since ξ ≤ ζ , condition (5.5) is equivalent to
V
−z,ϕ
t ≥ −ζt, 0 ≤ t ≤ τ a.s. and V −z,ϕτ ≥ −ξτ a.s. , ∀α ∈ U .
It follows that Brξ,ζ(z) = Sr−ζ,−ξ(−z), where Sr−ζ,−ξ(−z) is the set of seller’s robust super-
hedges against the game option with payoffs (−ζ,−ξ) associated with initial capital −z. We
thus have
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Theorem 5.6. The buyer’s robust price of the game option with payoffs (ξ, ζ) is equal to
the opposite of the seller’s robust price of the game option with payoffs (−ζ,−ξ).
The previous results (Theorem 4.6 and 4.7) can thus be applied. In particular, we have
the following dual formulation of the buyer’s robust price:
u˜0 = inf
α∈U
sup
τ∈T
inf
σ∈T
E˜gα0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)] = inf
α∈U
inf
σ∈T
sup
τ∈T
E˜gα0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)], (5.7)
where E˜gα0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)] = −Eg
α
0,τ∧σ[−I(τ, σ)]. Using (5.4), we derive that the buyer’s robust price
u˜0 is equal to the infimum over α ∈ U of the buyer’s prices in Mα.
Remark 5.7. By Proposition 4.8, we derive that
u˜0 = sup
τ∈T
inf
α∈U
inf
σ∈T
E˜gα0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)].
Note that for each α ∈ U , the quantity E˜gα0,τ∧σ[I(τ, σ)] is the buyer’s price in the market model
Mα of the European option with payoff I(τ, σ) and terminal time τ ∧ σ (see (5.1)).
Let (Y˜ , Z˜, K˜, A˜, A˜′) be the solution of the DRBSDE associated with driver G defined by
(4.8) and barriers (−ζ,−ξ). By Theorem 4.7, the buyer’s robust price of the game option
is equal to −Y˜0, that is, u˜0 = −Y˜0. Moreover, by Theorem 4.6, when ξ is left-u.s.c. along
stopping times (but not necessarily −ζ), the pair (τ˜ , ϕ˜), where τ˜ := inf{t ≥ 0 : −Y˜t = ξt}
and ϕ˜ := Φ(Z˜, K˜), is a buyer’s robust super-hedge of the game option.
5.3 Seller’s price and buyer’s price processes of the game option
We can define the seller’s price of the game option at each stopping time S ∈ T . More
precisely, for each wealth X ∈ L2(FS) (at initial time S), an S-super-hedge against the game
option is a pair (σ, ϕ) of a stopping time σ ∈ TS and a portfolio strategy ϕ ∈ H2 ×H2λ such
that V S,X,ϕt ≥ ξt, S ≤ t ≤ σ a.s. and V S,X,ϕσ ≥ ζσ a.s. , where V S,X,ϕ denotes the wealth
process associated with initial time S and initial condition X . The seller’s price at time S
is defined by u(S) := ess inf{X ∈ L2(FS), ∃(σ, ϕ) ∈ SS(X)}, where SS(X) is the set of all
S-super-hedges associated with initial wealth X . Using similar arguments to those used in
the proof of Theorem 3.11, we obtain:
u(S) = ess inf
σ∈TS
ess sup
τ∈TS
EgS,τ∧σ(I(τ, σ)) = ess sup
τ∈TS
ess inf
σ∈TS
EgS,τ∧σ(I(τ, σ)) = YS a.s.
where (Y, Z,K,A,A′) is the solution of DRBSDE (3.5).
Similarly, we can define the buyer’s price at time S.
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5.4 Game options with intermediate dividends
Suppose that a European option pays a terminal payoff ξ at terminal time S and an inter-
mediate dividend, modeled by a nondecreasing RCLL adapted process (Dt) with D0 = 0.
There exists an unique solution (X,Z,K) in S2 ×H2 ×H2λ of the following BSDE:
− dXt = g(t, Xt, Zt, Kt)dt+ dDt − ZtdWt −KtdMt; XS = ξ. (5.8)
The process X is the wealth process associated with initial value x = X0 and strategy ϕ
= Φ(Z,K). Here, dDt represents the amount withdrawn from the portfolio between t and
t + dt in order to pay the dividends to the buyer. Hence, the amount X0 allows the seller
to be perfectly hedged against the option, in the sense that it allows him/her to pay the
intermediate dividends and the terminal payoff to the buyer, by investing the amount X0
along the strategy ϕ in the market. The price for the seller (at time 0) of this option is thus
given by X0 and the associated hedging strategy is equal to ϕ. Note that the driver of BSDE
(5.8) is given by the λ-admissible “generalized” driver g(t, Xt, Zt, Kt)dt+ dDt. This leads to
the following nonlinear pricing system:
For each S ∈ [0, T ], for each ξ ∈ L2(GS) and for each D ∈ A2, the associated g-value is
defined by E g,Dt,S (ξ) := XDt (S, ξ) for each t ∈ [0, S]. Note that E g,Dt,S (ξ) can be defined on the
whole interval [0, T ] by setting E g,Dt,S (ξ) := E g
S,DS
t,T (ξ) for t ≥ S, where gS(t, .) := g(t, .)1t≤S
and DSt := Dt∧S . Some properties of this nonlinear pricing system are provided in [15].
Concerning the pricing of the game option, the approach is the same, replacing the driver g
by the “generalized” driver g(·)dt+ dDt, and E g by E g,D .
6 Appendix
We show the following estimates for DRBSDEs in our framework, with universal constants.
Proposition 6.1 (A priori estimate for DRBSDEs). Let f 1 be a λ-admissible driver with
λ-constant C and let f 2 be a driver. Let ξ and ζ be two adapted RCLL processes with ζT = ξT
a.s., ξ ∈ S2, ζ ∈ S2, ξt ≤ ζt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T a.s. , and satisfying Mokobodzki’s condition.
For i = 1, 2, let (Y i, Z i, Ki, Ai, A
′i) be a solution of the DRBSDE associated with terminal
time T , driver f i and barriers ξ and ζ. Let η, β > 0 be such that β ≥ 3
η
+ 2C and η ≤ 1
C2
.
Let f¯(s) := f 1(s, Y 2s , Z
2
s , K
2
s )− f 2(s, Y 2s , Z2s , K2s ). For each t ∈ [0, T ], we then have
eβt(Y 1s − Y 2s )2 ≤ η E[
∫ T
t
eβsf¯(s)2ds | Gt] a .s. (6.1)
Moreover, ‖Y¯ ‖2β ≤ Tη‖f¯‖2β, and if η < 1C2 , we then have ‖Z¯‖2β + ‖K¯‖2λ,β ≤ η1−ηC2 ‖f¯‖2β.
Proof. For s in [0, T ], denote Y¯s := Y
1
s − Y 2s , Z¯s := Z1s − Z2s , K¯s := K1s − K2s . By Itoˆ’s
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formula applied to the semimartingale eβsY¯s between t and T , we get
eβtY¯ 2t + β
∫ T
t
eβsY¯ 2s ds+
∫ T
t
eβsZ¯2sds+
∫ T
t
eβsK¯2sλsds+
∑
0<s≤T
eβs(∆A1s −∆A2s −∆A
′1
s +∆A
′2
s )
2
= 2
∫ T
t
eβsY¯s(f
1(s, Y 1s , Z
1
s , K
1
s )− f 2(s, Y 2s , Z2s , K2s ))ds
− 2
∫ T
t
eβsY¯sZ¯sdWs −
∫ T
t
eβs(2Y¯s−K¯s + K¯
2
s )dMt
+ 2
∫ T
t
eβsY s−dA
1
s − 2
∫ T
t
eβsY s−dA
2
s − 2
∫ T
0
eβsY s− dA
′1
s −
∫ T
0
eβsY s− dA
′2
s . (6.2)
Now, we have Y sdA
1,c
s = (Y
1
s − ξs)dA1,cs − (Y 2s − ξs)dA1,cs = −(Y 2s − ξs)dA1,cs ≤ 0, and by
symmetry, Y sdA
2,c
s ≥ 0. By similar arguments, we obtain Y s−∆A1,ds ≤ 0, Y s−∆A2,ds ≥ 0,
Y sdA
′1,c
s ≥ 0, Y s−∆A′1,ds ≥ 0 and Y s−∆A′2,ds ≤ 0. Hence, the four last terms of the r.h.s. of
(6.2) are non positive. Taking the conditional expectation given Gt, we obtain
eβtY¯ 2t + E
[
β
∫ T
t
eβsY¯ 2s ds+
∫ T
t
eβs(Z¯2s + K¯
2
sλs)ds | Gt
]
≤ 2E
[∫ T
t
eβsY¯s(f
1(s, Y 1s , Z
1
s , K
1
s )− f 2(s, Y 2s , Z2s , K2s ))ds | Gt
]
. (6.3)
Also, |f 1(s, Y 1s , Z1s , K1s )− f 2(s, Y 2s , Z2s , K2s )| ≤ |f 1(s, Y 1s , Z1s , K1s )− f 1(s, Y 2s , Z2s , K2s )|+ |f¯s|.
Using the λ-admissibility property of f 1, we derive that
|f 1(s, Y 1s , Z1s , K1s )− f 2(s, Y 2s , Z2s , K2s )| ≤ C|Y¯s|+ C|Z¯s|+ C|K¯s|
√
λs + |f¯s|.
Note now that, for all non negative numbers λ, y, z, k, f and ε > 0, we have
2y(Cz + Ck
√
λ+ f) ≤ y2
ε2
+ ε2(Cz + Ck
√
λ+ f)2 ≤ y2
ε2
+ 3ε2(C2y2 + C2k2λ+ f 2). Hence,
eβtY¯ 2t + E
[
β
∫ T
t
eβsY¯ 2s ds+
∫ T
t
eβs(Z¯2s + K¯
2
sλs)ds | Gt
]
≤ E
[
(2C +
1
ε2
)
∫ T
t
eβsY¯ 2s ds+ 3C
2ε2
∫ T
t
eβs(Z¯2s + K¯
2
sλs)ds+ 3ε
2
∫ T
t
eβsf¯ 2s ds | Gt
]
. (6.4)
Let us make the change of variable η = 3ǫ2. Then, for each β, η > 0 chosen as in the
proposition, these inequalities lead to (6.1). By integrating (6.1), we obtain ‖Y¯ ‖2β ≤ Tη‖f¯‖2β.
Using inequality (6.4), the last assertion of the Proposition follows.
From these estimates, we derive an existence and uniqueness result for DRBSDEs.
Proof of the existence and the uniqueness of the solution of a DRBSDE (3.5):
Let us first consider the case when the driver g(t) does not depend on the solution. By
using the representation property of G-martingales (Lemma 2.1) and some results of Dynkin
games theory, one can show, proceeding as in [14], that there exists a unique solution of the
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associated DRBSDE (3.5). The proof in the general case is the same as for non reflected
BSDEs with default jump (see the proof of Proposition 2.6 in [15]). It is based on a fixed
point argument, using the previous estimates. 
We state a comparison result of analysis for differential equations (deterministic). Let
L2 = L2([0, T ], dt) be the space of square integrable Borelian real valued maps on [0, T ].
Lemma 6.2 (Comparison for differential equations). For i = 1, 2, let bi : [0, T ] × R →
R; (t, y) 7→ bi(t, y) be a Borelian map with bi(., 0) ∈ L2, and supposed to be uniformly Lipschitz
with respect to y. Let f 1, f 2 be right-continuous maps in L2 and let x1, x2 ∈ R. For i = 1, 2,
let yi be the unique right-continuous map in L2 satisfying the differential equation:
yit := xi +
∫ t
0
bi(s, y
i
s)ds+ f
i(t).
Suppose that x1 ≥ x2 and b1(t, y2t ) ≥ b2(t, y2t ) 0 ≤ t ≤ T ds-a.e. Suppose also that f 1 =
f 2 + A, where A is a non decreasing right-continuous map on [0, T ] with A0 = 0. We then
have y1t ≥ y2t for each t ∈ [0, T ]. Moreover, if x1 > x2, then y1t > y2t for each t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. The proof is classical. We have dy¯t = λty¯tdt+(b1(t, y
2
t )−b2(t, y2t ))dt+dAt, where y¯ :=
y1−y2 and λt := (b1(t, y1t )−b1(t, y2t ))(y¯t)−11y1t 6=y2t . Hence, y¯t = x1−x2+
∫ t
0
e−
∫ t
s
λudu(b1(s, y
2
s)−
b2(s, y
2
s))ds+
∫ t
0
e−
∫ t
s
λududAs ≥ 0. Moreover, if x1 > x2, then the inequality is strict.
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